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CHAPTER 7 
Conflict of Laws 
FRANCIS J. NICHOLSON, S.J.* 
A. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
§ 7.1. National Move from Vested Rights to Contacts Analysis. There 
have been significant changes in Massachusetts in the area of conflict of 
laws since the Annual Survey last examined this subject. 1 During the past 
ten years the Supreme Judicial Court has made a definitive move from the 
venerable vested rights choice-of-Iaw rules to a contacts resolution of 
choice-of-Iaw problems. 2 
The vested rights approach is based upon the principle of territorial 
jurisdiction so pre-eminent in the common law. The territorial theory 
mandated that the governing law for a given transaction was that of the 
place where the transaction took place. Thus, the lex loci delicti rule, the 
law of the place of the injury, determines which law governs the substan-
tive rights of the parties in a multistate tort case. Likewise, the lex loci 
contractus principle, the law of the place of the making of the contract, 
controls the validity of contracts involving parties from two or more 
states. The vested rights lex loci rule was adopted by the original Re-
statement of Conflict of Laws of the American Law Institute. 3 
The vested rights approach did provide uniformity and predictability to 
conflicts cases, a very desirable policy goal for conflicts law. All too often, 
however, the single factor lex loci rule eliminated consideration of other, 
important substantial contacts of the multi state transaction. As a result, 
the rigidity of the vested rights doctrine frequently led to absurd and 
unjust decisions. The past thirty years have seen an accelerating depar-
ture from the inflexible vested rights doctrine as recognition of its in-
adequacies increased. 
The retreat from the vested rights approach has been in favor of the 
adoption of the contacts resolution of conflicts cases. The contacts meth-
odology brings a more functional and less mechanical analysis to the 
* FRANCIS J. NICHOLSON, S.J., is a Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. 
§ 7.1. I The Massachusetts conflict oflaws doctrine was last examined by the Survey in 
the 1970 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW §§ 3.1-3.5, at 59-68. 
2 See, e.g., Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Servs. Inc., 378 Mass. 535, 392 N.E.2d 1045 
(1979); Saharceski v. Marcure, 373 Mass. 304, 366 N.E.2d 1245 (1977). 
3 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934). 
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cases. The following theories have been the most influential in promoting 
the contacts approach: (1) the late Professor Brainerd Currie's "gov-
ernmental interest" analysis;4 (2) the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
Laws' "most significant relationship" rule;5 and (3) Professor Robert 
Leflar's five "choice-influencing considerations" analysis. 6 Although 
there are differences of emphasis among these three formulations, they 
agree in stressing the importance of evaluating all the substantial contacts 
of the conflicts situation. They reject the exclusive, one-dimensional lex 
loci rule. 
The impetus given to the contacts choice-of-Iaw analysis of cases has 
found support in the conflicts decisions of many state courts. Minnesota,? 
Wisconsin,8 New York,9 California,!O and New Jerseyll have been lead-
ers in promoting the new, functional method of conflicts resolution. The 
change has been most marked in the tort cases, and somewhat less so in 
the contract cases. There has been very little movement from the tradi-
tional vested rights doctrine in the real property area. The uneven rate of 
change in the various topics of conflicts law has been matched by the 
degree of speed with which the states have abandoned the traditional 
vested rights doctrine. A sizeable minority of jurisdictions still follow the 
lex loci choice-of-Iaw position in conflicts cases.!2 Massachusetts was 
among this minority of states until very recently. 
§ 7.2. Law of Domicile of Married Woman. A decision of the Supreme 
Judicial Court with respect to the concept of domicile first signaled the 
new judicial thinking in conflicts law in Massachusetts. Domicile plays a 
pivotal role in many areas of conflict of laws, such as choice of law in 
some personal property cases, divorce jurisdiction, and the power to levy 
death taxes. The traditional common law of conflicts tended to reduce the 
subject of domicile to hard-and-fast rules. Many of these traditional rules 
are clearly inconsistent with attitudes and life styles in the second half of 
the twentieth century. Recent decisions from many jurisdictions have 
rejected such anachronisms.! 
The Supreme Judicial Court has brought the law of domicile in Massa-
4 B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1%3). 
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971). 
6 R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW (3d ed. 1977). 
7 Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957). 
8 Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis.2d 130,95 N.W.2d 814 (1959). 
9 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1%3). 
10 Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31, 432 P.2d 727 (1%7). 
11 Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., 55 N.J. 511, 263 A.2d 129 (1970). 
12 See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6.16-6.19 (2d ed. 
1980). 
§ 7.2. 1 W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 8-27 (7th ed. 1978). 
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chusetts into the twentieth century as well. In Green v. Commissioner of 
Corporations and Taxation,2 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts, on transfer from the Appeals Court, held that a married woman could 
have a domicile separate from that of her husband for tax purposes. This 
decision departed from the common law rule hitherto followed in Massa-
chusetts. In the process the Court disclosed an affinity for the approach of 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws3 for solving conflict problems. 
In Green, the husband and wife, at the time of the marriage, were 
domiciled in Massachusetts and New Hampshire, respectively.4 By agree-
ment they lived apart in their previous homes until the wife wound up her 
business in New Hampshire. s The wife realized a capital gain of some 
$25,000 through the sale of stock and, thereafter, moved to Massachusetts 
to live with her husband. 6 The couple filed a joint resident income tax 
return but did not report the wife's capital gain. 7 The Commissioner of 
Corporations and Taxation (the "Commissioner") assessed an additional 
tax against the couple based on the income received by the wife before 
she moved to Massachusetts. 8 In support of this assessment the Commis-
sioner cited chapter 62, section 5 of the General Laws, under which 
income "received by any inhabitant of the commonwealth," including 
"net capital gain," was taxable. 9 The sole issue before the Court was 
whether the wife's domicile for tax purposes became that of her husband 
before she moved to Massachusetts. lo 
The Supreme Judicial Court had previously held that the income sub-
ject to tax under section 5 was that received by persons who were 
inhabitants of the Commonwealth "at the time of receipt." II To be an 
"inhabitant" of the Commonwealth within the meaning of the tax statute 
is equivalent to being domiciled in Massachusetts. 12 From these premises, 
the Commissioner argued that the income received by the wife while she 
lived in New Hampshire was subject to Massachusetts tax, by virtue of 
2 364 Mass. 389, 305 N.E.2d 92 (1973). 
J ld. at 394,305 N.E.2d at 95 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 
§ 21 & comment d (1971). 
4 /d. at 390, 305 N.E.2d at 92. 
5 /d. 
6 /d., at 390, 305 N.E.2d at 92-93. 
7 /d., at 390, 305 N.E.2d at 93. 
8 /d. 
9 ld. at 390-91, 305 N.E.2d at 93. 
10 ld. at 389, 305 N.E.2d at 92. 
11 /d. at 391, 305 N.E.2d at 93 (citing Kennedy v. Commissioner of Corporations and 
Taxation, 256 Mass. 426, 430, 152 N .E. 747, 748 (1926». 
12 ld. (citing Ness v. Comm'r of Corps. & Taxation, 279 Mass. 369, 373, 181 N.E. 178, 
180 (1932)). 
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the traditional common law rule that a married woman has the same 
domicile as her husband. 13 
At common law a married woman had no capacity to acquire her own 
domicile and was assigned that of her husband by operation oflaw,14 The 
husband and wife were looked upon as one legal entity. Divorce cases 
made one of the earliest inroads upon this harsh common law rule. For 
example, it was recognized that a wife could keep or acquire a separate 
domicile for the purpose of bringing a divorce action if she had been 
wronged by her husband. IS Recent decisions in some states have recog-
nized separate domiciles for husband and wife for purposes other than 
divorce jurisdiction. 16 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 
however, as late as 1968, retained the established common law rule that a 
wife's domicile, absent some marital wrong committed by her husband, 
follows that of her husband.n 
In the Green case, the Supreme Judicial Court acknowledged that the 
common law rule was unrealistic in the context of present-day domestic 
relationships.18 The Court noted that the common law rule had been 
subjected to severe erosion in other states. 19 It cited with approbation the 
rule found in section 21, comment d, of the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws: "A wife who lives apart from her husband can acquire a 
separate domicile of choice.' '20 Recognizing important changes in popular 
as well as legal thinking, the Court concluded that" 'ancient canards 
about the proper role of women' have no place in the law. "21 The Court 
then rejected the Commissioner's argument that the wife had taken her 
husband's Massachusetts domicile before she moved to Massachusetts. 
The Court found little support for the Commissioner's attempt to extend 
the "vanishing fiction of identity of person" into the area of taxation. 22 
The Court decreed, therefore, that the plaintiffs were not liable for the 
additional tax assessed against them. 23 
The Green decision made a long overdue change in the law of domicile 
of the married woman. It is true, of course, that in most situations 
husband and wife will live together in a single home and, therefore, will 
13 /d. (citing Anderson v. Anderson, 354 Mass. 565, 568, 238 N.E.2d 868, 870 (1968». 
14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 21 comment a (1971). 
15 R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § II (3d ed. 1977); E. ScOLES & P. HAY, 
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 4.33-4.34 (1982). 
16 W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, supra note I, at 23. 
17 Anderson v. Anderson, 354 Mass. 565, 568, 238 N.E.2d 868, 870 (1968). 
18 364 Mass. at 394, 305 N.E.2d at 95. 
19 [d. at 393, 305 N.E.2d at 95. 
20 /d. at 394, 305 N.E.2d at 95. 
21 /d. 
22 ld. 
23 [d. at 395, 305 N.E.2d at 96. 
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have the same domicile. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that legal 
rules regarding the husband-wife relationship should keep abreast of 
current social attitudes concerning the independence of women. To condi-
tion the separate domicile of the married woman upon a marital wrong 
committed by her husband is to disregard the habits and attitudes in the 
United States today. In the Green case the Supreme Judicial Court ac-
knowledged the necessity for a new approach to conflicts analysis. As 
noted, the Court turned to the Restatement (Second) for guidance. 24 The 
Court has subsequently used a similar approach in other areas of conflicts 
law. 
§ 7.3. Law of Domicile of Students - Freedom of Choice for Voting 
Purposes. Under the common law every person must have a domicile. At 
birth the legitimate child takes his father's domicile by operation of law. 
As an adult with legal capacity he may acquire a new domicile, a domicile 
of choice. The acquisition of the new domicile requires physical presence 
at a new location and the intention of regarding the new place as one's 
home. The presence and intention must occur together. 1 Usually, the 
person claiming a domicile of choice can easily prove his physical pres-
ence in the particular place. Proof of intention to make that place one's 
home can be a more difficult task. 2 It is essential that a person establish 
his present intention to remain in the place for a period of time, and 
frequently the evidence is equivocal. Proving the requisite intent has been 
a problem for students who attend college away from home. Most stu-
dents get financial support from their parents and regard their parent's 
dwelling as "home." The courts, therefore, have tended to hold that a 
student does not acquire a domicile of choice in the place where the 
school or college is located. 3 
The problem of a student's domicile often arose in cases where a court 
had to decide whether a student had the capacity to choose his domicile 
for voting purposes. Under traditional domicile notions, many students 
would be prevented from voting as a resident of the locus of their college. 
In Hershkoff v. Board of Registrars of Voters of Worcester, 4 the Supreme 
Judical Court of Massachusetts ruled that college students have the capac-
ity to choose their domicile for voting purposes despite support by parents 
24 ld. at 395, 305 N.E.2d at 95. 
§ 7.3. 1 R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW §§ 9-10 (3d ed. 1977); E. SCOLES & 
P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 4.17-4.20 (1982). 
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18 (1971). 
3 ld. 
4 366 Mass. 570, 321 N.E.2d at 656 (1974). 
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and dormitory residence. The Court· refused to follow anachronistic 
common law rules with respect to domicile. s 
In Hershkoff three students at colleges in Worcester, Massachusetts, 
sought to register to vote in Worcester. 6 The board of registrars of voters 
(the "board") denied the applications on the grounds that the domiciles of 
two ofthe students were New York and that the domicile ofthe third was 
Pennsylvania. 7 On petitions for writs of certiorari, the superior court 
ordered that the decisions be quashed and that the board cause the 
students to be registered as voters in Worcester. 8 The board appealed. 9 
The cases were consolidated for appeal and were transferred. lo The 
Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the orders of the superior court. II 
The Court acknowledged that the words "resided" and "inhabitant" in 
constitutional and statutory provisions relating to voting had long been 
construed to require that the voter have his domicile in the appropriate 
city or town. 12 This statutory construction depended on the common law 
doctrine of domicile. 13 The Court also conceded that earlier decisions had 
held that support by parents or dormitory residence limited the young 
voter's freedom of choice of domicile. 14 In HershkoJJ, however, the Court 
departed from its earlier views and held that young people who leave 
home to go to college are free to establish new homes in college dor-
mitories, even if there is a showing of parental support. IS In so ruling, the 
Court aligned itself with courts in other jurisdictions which have recog-
nized the capacity of college students to acquire a new domicile for voting 
purposes. 16 
The Court then addressed the issue of the duration of time required to 
establish a domicileY Traditional conflicts law found in older cases 
emphasized the idea of fixity. 18 A domicile was the place of one's actual 
5 The Court had similarly rejected the rigid common law formula for determining domicile 
in Green v. Comm'r of Corporations and Taxation, 364 Mass. 389, 305 N.E.2d 92 (1973), 
which is discussed in section 2 of this chapter. 
6 366 Mass. at 571, 321 N.E.2d at 659. 
7 /d. 
8 [d. 
9 [d. at 573, 321 N.E.2d at 661. 
10 [d. at 574, 321 N.E.2d at 661. 
11 [d. at 571,321 N.E.2d at 659-60. 
12 [d. at 576, 321 N.E.2d at 662. 
13 /d. 
14 /d. at 578, 321 N.E.2d at 663 (citing Opinion of the Justices, 46 Mass. (5 Met.) 587, 
589-90 (1843». 
15 [d. at 578, 321 N.E.2d 663-64. 
16 See Ramey v. Rockefeller, 348 F. Supp. 780 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Newburger v. Peterson, 
344 F. Supp. 559 (D.N.H. 1972). 
17 366 Mass. at 578-79, 321 N.E.2d at 664. 
18 See Opinion of the Justices, 365 Mass. 661-63, 312 N.E.2d 208-09 (1974). 
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residence where one intended to remain permanently or for an indefinite 
time. 19 The court rejected this venerable common law doctrine and en-
dorsed the rule of section 18 of Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws: 
"To acquire a domicile of choice in a place, a person must intend to make 
that place his horne for the time at least.' '20 If there is an intention to make 
a horne here and now, that intention is sufficient, even though the person 
whose domicile is in question intends to change his horne at some time in 
the future. 21 The Court found, on the evidence presented in HershkoJJ, 
that each student plaintiff actually resided in Worcester with intention to 
make Worcester his horne for the time at least. 22 Each was therefore 
domiciled in Worcester and was not disqualified from voting by reason of 
domicile elsewhere. 23 The Court concluded by stating that the decisions of 
the board were erroneous and that the superior court properly ordered 
them quashed. 24 
In HershkoJJ the Supreme Judicial Court gave further evidence of its 
intention to update Massachusetts conflicts law. In this era of widespread 
planning for change of residence and occupation, a requirement of inten-
tion to stay permanently or indefinitely in one place makes no sense. The 
Court's acceptance ofthe test set out in Restatement (Second),25 is much 
more responsive to the interests and expectations of today's society, 
where separation from horne and hearth by young people is a way of life. 
The reliance on the Restatement (Second) is worth noting because it is 
indicative of the Court's current approach to conflicts problems in gen-
eral.26 
19 [d. 
20 366 Mass. at 578-79,321 N.E.2d at 664 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT 
OF LAWS, § 18 (1971). 
21 /d. (citing Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488, 501 (1813». 
22 /d. at 580, 321 N.E.2d at 665. 
23 /d. 
24 /d. at 580-81, 321 N.E.2d at 665. 
2S [d. at 578-79,321 N.E.2d at 664 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF 
LAWS § 18 (1971). 
26 It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Judicial Court carried its approach in 
Hershkoffbeyond even the Restatement (Second) position in a later domicile case. Dane v. 
Bd. of Registrars of Voters of Concord, 374 Mass. 152,371 N.E.2d 1358 (1978). In Dane the 
principal issue was whether approximately 300 inmates imprisoned at the Massachusetts 
Correctional Institution at Concord could register to vote. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that, 
because the inmates did not reside voluntarily at Concord, they lacked the intent necessary 
to establish legal domicile in the town, and therefore were not entitled to register as voters in 
the town. It has been the general rule that inmates of penal institutions cannot acquire a 
domicile of choice in the place of their imprisonment because there is no freedom of choice. 
The Restatement (Second) provides: "A person does not acquire a domicile of choice by his 
presence in a place under physical or legal compulsion." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
7
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§ 7.4. Tort Choice-of-Iaw Rule - Law of Jurisdiction With Most Contacts 
Controls. In Pevoski v. Pevoski,l the Supreme Judicial Court held that 
Massachusetts law, rather than New York law, governed the issue of 
interspousal immunity in a suit arising out of an automobile accident 
which occurred in New York. This holding represents a definitive rejec-
tion of the vested rights lex loci delicti rule, which previously had been 
firmly established as the general tort conflicts rule in Massachusetts. The 
Pevoski decision is a logical continuation of the changed conflicts analysis 
used by the Court in earlier cases. 2 
In Pevoski, the plaintiff and the defendant were a married couple. 3 In 
August, 1971, their automobile was involved in a three-car collision in 
New York. 4 All of the cars were registered, insured, and garaged in 
Massachusetts, and all three vehicles were operated by residents of the 
Commonwealth. s The plaintiff wife, a passenger in the car driven by her 
husband, brought an action against him seeking damages for injuries 
sustained in the accident. 6 The superior court granted the husband's 
motion for summary judgment on the ground of interspousal tort immu-
nity.7 The wife appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court. 8 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 17 (1971). "Under the rule of this section, it is impossible for a person 
to acquire domicile in the jail in which he is incarcerated. To enter jail, one must first be 
legally committed and thereby lose all power of choice over the place of one's abode." Id. at 
§ 17 comment c. In Dane the Court refused to follow the inflexible rule of the common law 
and the Restatement (Second). Citing its decision in Hershkoff the Court stated: 
We think that prisoners, like ... students, should be able to "rebut" the presumption 
that by reason of their involuntary presence at the place of incarceration they have 
retained their former domicile. We here recognize the capability of those imprisoned 
in Massachusetts correctional institutions to form the requisite intent to make the 
place of their incarceration their domicile for voting purposes. 
374 Mass. at 165-66,371 N.E.2d at 1367. It is difficult to imagine that any inmate in a prison 
would consider the prison his "home," and be judged to have his domicile there. A person's 
domicile is usually the place where he has his home. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11 (1971). The ruling in Dane indicates very clearly that the Supreme 
Judicial Court is moving away from the rigid concepts of the common law of conflicts toward 
a more flexible attitude. 
§ 7.4. I 371 Mass. 358, 358 N.E.2d 416 (1976). 
2 See Green v. Comm'r of Corporations and Taxation, 364 Mass. 389, 305 N.E.2d 92 
(1973); HershkofIv. Board of Registrars of Voters of Worcester, 366 Mass. 570, 321 N.E.2d 
656 (1974). Those cases are discussed in sections 1 and 2 of this chapter. 




7 Jd. at 358-59, 358 N.E.2d at 417. 
8 Id. at 359, 358 N.E.2d at 417. 
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The first question presented by the appeal was the conflicts problem.9 
Because an interspousal tort action such as Mrs. Pevoski's was clearly a 
viable claim under New York law, but was uncertain under Massachu-
setts law, the issue of which law to apply to the wife's action was 
material. 10 The Court recognized that the Massachusetts courts had al-
ways followed the lex loci delicti rule. 11 It added that this rule would 
continue to provide a reasonable procedure for selecting the law govern-
ing many of the issues in multi state tort cases.12 For example, in motor 
vehicle torts, the Court explained, standards of negligence would be 
provided by the law of the jurisdiction in which the accident occurred.13 
Rules of the road are appropriately determined by the state having the 
greatest interest in regulating the conduct of drivers on its highways.14 
The Court then made its break from the traditional law of the place of 
the tort rule by quoting from Babcock v. Jackson,ls the trend-setting 
decision of the New York Court of Appeals. 16 In Babcock, the New York 
court repudiated the lex loci delicti doctrine, rejecting a rule which would 
require that all issues in a tort case automatically be resolved by the law of 
the jurisdiction where the tort occurred. 17 The Babcock court held instead 
that disposition of issues "must tum ... on the law of the jurisdiction 
which has the strongest interest in the resoluion of the particular issue 
presented."18 The Supreme Judicial Court expressed its agreement with 
the conflicts approach taken by the Babcock case, and found that New 
York had no legitimate interest in regulating the interspousal relationships 
of Massachusetts domiciliaries who happened to be injured within its 
borders.19 The financial and social impact of the suit fell only on Massa-
chusetts domiciliaries and a Massachusetts insurer.2o Therefore, the 




1\ [d. (citing Brogie v. Vogel, 348 Mass. 619, 205 N.E.2d 234 (1965»; Goodale v. 
Morrison, 343 Mass. 607, 180 N.E.2d 67 (1962); Murphy v. Smith, 307 Mass. 64, 29 N.E.2d 
726 (1940). 
12 371 Mass. at 359, 358 N.E.2d at 417. 
13 [d. 
14 [d. 
IS Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963). 
16 371 Mass. at 359-60, 358 N.E.2d at 417 (quoting Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 
484, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 752, 191 N.E.2d 279, 285 (1963». 
17 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 484, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 752, 191 N.E.2d 279, 285 
(1963). 
18 [d. 
19 [d. at 360, 358 N.E.2d at 417. 
20 [d. 
21 [d, at 361, 358 N.E.2d at 418. 
9
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The Court then turned to the second issued in Pevoski, concerning the 
substantive law of the Commonwealth regarding interspousal tort ac-
tions. 22 The Court had recently eliminated the anachronistic, common law 
rule of interspousal immunity in Lewis v. Lewis. 23 The accident giving rise 
to the cause of action in Pevoski, however, occurred in 1971, prior to the 
Lewis decision. Thus, the Court was faced with the question of whether 
the principle of the Lewis case should be applied retroactively to the 
wife's claim inPevoski. 24 The Court answered the question in the affirma-
tive. 25 The Court reasoned that because of the availability of insurance 
coverage, retroactive application of the Lewis rule would not have a 
substantial impact on the expectations of the insured or their insurers. 26 
The Court then reversed the order of the superior court granting the 
defendant's motion for summary judgment. 27 
In Pevoski, the Supreme Judicial Court accepts the change in thinking 
which characterizes much of the recent. development in the field of 
conflict oflaws. This change has been especially striking in the torts area. 
Fundamentally, this departure from traditional doctrine represents the 
gradual discrediting of the vested rights theory, which demands the rec-
ognition and enforcement of rights which are judged to have "vested" by 
virtue of their creation by the law of the place where the activities 
occurred. The vested rights approach in the torts field, concomitantly 
with the customary substance-procedure characterization, inculcates the 
traditional place-of-wrong rule which states that the substantive law of the 
place where the act occurs determines whether there is a cause of action 
sounding in tort. In addition, all substantive questions relating to the 
existence of a tort claim are governed by the same law. 28 
The old vested rights theory emphasizes the value of predictability and 
discouragement of forum shopping. The automatic application of the law 
of the place of the wrong promotes these goals but, in the process, this 
one-dimensional test makes no provision for the law of the state which has 
the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties. Such 
relationships must be recognized if oppressiveness to legitimate and law-
ful state interests is to be avoided. 
The decision of the Supreme Judicial Court in Pevoski was a correct 
one. Massachusetts, the domiciliary state, clearly had more concern with 
the issue of inter spousal immunity than New York. 29 The adoption by the 
22 [d. 
23 370 Mass. 619, 351 N.E.2d 526 (1976). 
24 371 Mass. at 361, 358 N.E.2d at 418. 
25 [d. 
26 [d. at 361-62, 358 N.E.2d at 418. 
27 [d. at 362, 358 N.E.2d at 418. 
28 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-83 (1934). 
29 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 169 (1971). 
10
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Court of the significant contacts approach to tort conflicts cases was 
overdue. 
§ 7.5. Workmen's Compensation - Tort Suit Against Fellow Employee 
- Choice-of-Iaw Rule - Renvoi. In Saharceski v. Marcure,1 the Supreme 
Judicial Court resolved a choice-of-Iaw problem in a workmen's compen-
sation case. Following the rationale established in Pevoski v. Pevoski, 2 
the Court applied the law of Massachusetts to bar the plaintiff from 
recovering from his fellow worker for an injury suffered in Connecticut. 
The plaintiff and the defendant were residents of Massachusetts and 
employees of a Massachusetts corporation. 3 The corporation had no place 
of business in Connecticut and had no employees residing or working 
there. 4 It had purchased workmen's compensation insurance covering its 
employees.s In June of 1970, the plaintiff and the defendant traveled by 
motor vehicle on their employer's business from Massachusetts into 
Connecticut, intending to pass through that state without stopping. 6 The 
vehicle was owned by the corporation and was registered in Massachu-
setts.7 The defendant was driving the vehicle when he negligently struck 
another car in Connecticut. 8 The plaintiff, who sustained injuries in the 
accident, collected workmen's compensation from the company's insur-
ance carrier. 9 The plaintiff then brought suit for damages against the 
defendant. I 0 The superior court, after a jury verdict for the plaintiff, 
ordered judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict. 11 On 
direct appeal the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed,12 
Saharceski is an interesting decision because of the scope of the Court's 
opinion. In addition to resolving the conflict of laws problem, the Court 
addressed two questions pervasive in conflicts law: the limiting effect of 
the United States Constitution on state choice of conflicts rules; 13 and the 
renvoi doctrine. 14 First, however, the Court acknowledged that the laws of 
§ 7.5. 1 373 Mass. 304, 366 N.E.2d 1245 (1977). 
2 371 Mass. 358, 358 N .E.2d 416 (1976). The Pevoski decision is discussed in section 4 of 
this chapter. 





8 Id. at 305-06, 366 N.E.2d at 1246. 




13 Id. at 308-09, 366 N.E.2d at 1248. 
14 Id. at 312, 366 N.E.2d at 1250. 
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Massachusetts and Connecticut were in conflict regarding an employee's 
tort suit against a fellow employee. 15 In the Commonwealth, where com-
pensation benefits are available under chapter 152 of the General Laws, 
an employee injured in the course of his employment by the negligence of 
a fellow employee cannot recover from that fellow employee if the fellow 
employee was also acting in the course of his employment. 16 It is clear, on 
the other hand, that an employee injured in Connecticut in the course of 
his employment by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by a fellow 
employee may recover from that fellow employee under Connecticut 
law. 17 
The Court began its analysis by considering the effect of the United 
States Constitution on the choice-of-Iaw question involved in the case. IS 
The Court recognized that the states have exercised a great deal of 
latitude in formulating their own conflicts rules. Nevertheless, the Court 
noted, the due process l9 and full faith and credit20 clauses of the Constitu-
tion act as a limitation on the freedom of a state to develop its conflicts law 
without reference to the demands of federalism. 21 The United States 
Supreme Court has indicated that, under the due process clause, the 
application of the law of a state will be nullified if its relation to the parties 
or transaction is so insignificant as to make choice of its law arbitrary. 22 
Furthermore, even if a state has sufficient contacts under due process to 
justify application of its own law, in certain circumstances it may never-
theless be required by the full faith and credit clause to give effect to the 
law of a sister state. 23 The problem is striking the proper balance between 
the demands of the unifying principle found in the full faith and credit 
clause and the power of a state to apply its own law to persons and 
transactions bearing a substantial relation to its jurisdictional ambit. This 
basic conflict has thus far been resolved in favor of the forum and its law 
in such fields as insurance24 and workmen's compensation. 25 In these 
areas a state may choose its own law without violating the full faith and 
credit clause, if it has sufficient contacts to satisfy the due process clause. 
IS 373 Mass. at 306-08, 366 N.E.2d at 1246-48. 
16 Murphy v. Miettinen, 317 Mass. 633, 59 N.E.2d 252 (1945). 
17 Stulginski v. Cizauskas, 125 Conn. 293, 5 A.2d to (1939). Many states allow a suit 
against a fellow employee in such circumstances. See Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 845, 850 (1%8). 
18 373 Mass. at 308-09, 366 N.E.2d at 1248. 
19 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § l. 
20 U.S. CONST., art. IV, § l. 
21 372 Mass. at 309, 366 N.E.2d at 1248. 
22 See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). 
23 See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951); Order of United Commercial Travelers v. 
Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947). 
24 See Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943). 
2S See Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF 
LAWS § 183 (1971). 
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The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the conflicts question in 
Saharceski was not of constitutional dimensions. 26 "We are free to apply 
Connecticut law or Massachusetts law, just as Connecticut would have 
been free to apply the law of either state if this action had been brought 
there. "27 This judgment by the Court on the constitutional question is 
certainly correct. Both Connecticut and Massachusetts had sufficient 
contacts with the parties and the transaction to satisfy the due process and 
full faith and credit clauses of the United States Constitution under the 
United States Supreme Court guidelines. 
The Court then turned to the conflict of laws concerning the fellow 
employee's exemption from liability. 28 Citing its decision in Pevoski v. 
Pevoski,29 the Court found that there were substantial reasons for looking 
to the law of Massachusetts to determine whether the plaintiff should be 
allowed to maintain an action against his fellow employee. 3o Most sig-
nificant were the reasonable expectations of the parties, each of whom 
lived and was hired in Massachusetts.31 The workmen's compensation 
law of the Commonwealth bars an employee from recovering from a 
negligent fellow employee where common law rights are not reserved. 32 
The plaintiff had no reasonable basis for expecting to recover in this 
situation, and the defendant had no reason to expect that he would be 
liable. 33 The Court added that application of the law of the state of 
common employment provided a certain basis for the resolution of the 
issue and knowledge that the maintenance of a tort suit will not depend 
solely on the fortuitous place of the accident. 34 The Court concluded its 
consideration of the conflicts problem by stating: 
The elimination of happenstance, a sort of unknowing geographical Russian 
roulette, as the controlling factor is particularly significant in a case where 
no business was to be transacted in the jurisdiction where the injury took 
place. As a matter of choice of law, we conclude that the substantive law of 
the Commonwealth should apply to bar recovery by the plaintiff in this 
case. 35 
The Saharceski Court's resolution ofthe choice-of-Iaw question, reject-
ing the mechanical application of the law of the place of the tort, follows 
26 373 Mass. at 308-09, 366 N .E.2d at 1248. 
27 Id. at 309, 366 N .E.2d at 1248. 
28 373 Mass. at 310, 366 N.E.2d at 1248. 
29 371 Mass. 358, 358 N .E.2d 416 (1976). 





35 Id. at 311-12, 366 N.E.2d at 1249 (citing R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 
§§ 104-05 (rev. ed. 1%8». 
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the approach taken in more recent workmen's compensation cases. 36 
Given the social justice goals of the institution of workmen's compensa-
tion insurance, it makes eminent sense to choose the law of the state with 
the substantial connection with the employment relationship. As the 
Supreme Judicial Court's analysis clearly indicates, only Massachusetts 
had a significant interest in the rights of the parties in this case. It should 
be noted, too, that the Court's reliance on Pevoski underscores its dis-
avowal of the inflexible lex loci delicti rule in tort actions. 
The final issue considered by the Court in Saharceski is the possibility 
of determining that Massachusetts law applies through a different analyti-
cal approach.37 Assuming, arguendo, that the law of the place of the 
injury does determine substantive rights, "one might analyze this case in 
terms of the result which would be reached if this action had been brought 
in Connecticut. In such a case, one should look to the entire law of the 
State of Connecticut, including its conflict of laws rules. "38 Here, by way 
of dictum, the Court is suggesting the use of the renvoi doctrine. When a 
forum court decides that an issue should be governed by the law of 
another state, the question arises whether the forum court should apply 
the internal law of the other state or the latter's conflicts rules. If it applies 
the conflicts law of the second state, it is using the renvoi technique. The 
justification for the renvoi method is the guarantee of identical result, no 
matter where the suit is brought. American courts usually reject the 
renvoi approach except in cases involving title to land and the recognition 
offoreign divorces. 39 The Court's suggestion that Connecticut's conflicts 
law be looked at regarding the defendant's tort liability is very unusual. 
The Court's discussion of the renvoi technique is also puzzling. It is 
true that the renvoi has been used occasionally by American courts as an 
"escape device" to avoid unpalatable results dictated by a particular 
conflict of laws rule. The "escape device" approach usually surfaced 
when a state was making the transition from the vested rights to the 
contacts analysis. 40 Conflicts law in Massachusetts, however, has gone 
beyond the transitional stage. Perhaps the dictum further evidences the 
Supreme Judicial Court's rejection of the mechanical place of the tort 
rule. 
36 See Wilson v. Faull, 27 N.J. 105, 141 A.2d 768 (1958); R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CON-
FLICTS LAW § 160 (3d ed. 1977). 
37 373 Mass. at 312, 366 N.E.2d at 1250. 
38 /d. (emphasis added). 
39 See R. LEFLAR, supra note 36, at § 7; W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CONFLICT OF 
LAWS 28-37 (7th ed. 1978). 
40 See W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 39, at 450-53. 
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§ 7.6. Contract Choice-of-Iaw Rule - Law of Jurisdiction with Most 
Contacts Controls. In Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Services, Inc.,! the 
Supreme Judicial Court re-examined the Massachusetts choice-of-Iaw 
rule regarding contracts. Traditionally the Court had applied lex loci 
contractus, the law of the place where the contract was made, as the 
conflicts rule in suits to enforce contractual rights. While the facts in 
Choate, Hall & Stewart prevented the Court from explicitly disavowing 
the lex loci contractus rule, the Court's disapproval of that conflicts 
principle is clear. 
The plaintiff law partnership of Choate, Hall & Stewart brought this 
action against the defendant corporation to recover fees for legal services 
performed for one Steir, a director of the corporation.2 The claim was 
based on a provision of an agreement between the defendant and Steir by 
which the defendant undertook to pay legal fees incurred by Steir. 3 This 
agreement was a settlement contract entered into on the occasion of 
Steir's resignation from the corporation under less than amicable circum-
stances.4 The pertinent provision of the settlement contract provided that 
Steir could select his own counsel whose fees would be paid by the 
defendant corporation, "all to the maximum extent permissible under 
Delaware law."5 
The plaintiff law firm had represented Steir in matters connected with 
his termination and submitted statements of fees. 6 The defendant corpo-
ration refused payment. 7 The plaintiff brought an action for a declaratory 
judgment that it was entitled to the amount of fees stated.8 The superior 
court entered summary judgment for the defendant on the ground, inter 
alia, that under governing Massachusetts law the plaintiff had no standing 
to sue on the contract as a third-party beneficiary. 9 The plaintiff ap-
pealed. 10 The Supreme Judicial Court ordered direct appellate review and 
reversed. 11 
The significance of the Choate, Hall & Stewart decision can best be 
explained against the general background of the contracts problem in the 
atea of conflict of laws. Conflicts law as a whole is marked by ambiguity, 
but conflicts doctrine pertaining to the validity of contracts has been 
§ 7.6. [378 Mass. 535, 392 N.E.2d 1045 (1979). 
2 /d. at 536, 537, 392 N.E.2d at 1046. 
3 /d. at 537, 392 N.E.2d at 1047. 
4/d. 
s Id. at 537-38, 392 N .E.2d at 1047. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 539, 392 N .E.2d at 1047. 
8 /d. at 539, 392 N.E.2d at 1048. 
9 /d. at 540, 392 N .E.2d at 1048. 
[Old. 
[[ Id. at 540, 548, 392 N .E.2d at 1048, 1052. 
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singularly characterized by confusion. Three distinct conflicts rules have 
been applied by American courts as controlling the validity of contracts 
without much concern for the fact that the rules in question are often 
inconsistent with each other. These three rules provide a choice among 
the following in selecting the law to govern contract issues: (1) the law of 
the place of the making of the contract; (2) the law of the place of 
performance and; (3) the law intended by the parties. 12 In an attempt to 
end the confusion the original Restatement of Conflict of Laws adopted 
the rule that the law of the place of making determines the validity of a 
contract. 13 General acceptance of the Restatement position did not fol-
low, however, as courts logically rejected any mechanical application of 
lex loci contractus. Accordingly, the indiscriminate use of the three tradi-
tional rules has continued, although to a lessening degree in recent 
years. 14 
One new approach to the validity-of-contract problem, which is receiv-
ing increasing approbation by courts and publicists, is the "center of 
gravity" or "grouping of contacts" theory. A lucid exposition of the 
theory can be found in the New York Court of Appeals decision in Auten 
v. Auten. ls This new rule emphasizes the law of the place which has the 
most significant contacts with the transaction. Although it is obvious that 
the "center of gravity" theory affords less certainty and predictability 
than the original Restatement's rigid place-of-making rule, it has the 
advantage of allowing a court to focus its attention upon the law of the 
jurisdiction which has the paramount interest in the multi-state transac-
tion. The new rule realistically stresses the law which courts generally 
have applied in any case, even though they continued to pay lip service to 
one or more of the traditional rules. 16 The Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws has aligned itself with the "contacts" standard enun-
ciated in the Auten case. 17 In rejecting the dogma of lex loci contractus, it 
states that the validity of a contract is governed by the law of the state 
with which the transaction has "its most significant relationship." 18 
The Supreme Judicial Court, in its Choate, Hall & Stewart decision, 
agreed that the trial judge had made the proper choice oflaw .19 The law of 
12 See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW §§ 144-47 (3d ed. 1977); E. SCOLES & 
P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 18.13-18.15 (1982). 
13 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (1934). 
14 See R. LEFLAR, supra note 12, at § 145; E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 12, at 
§ 18.14. 
15 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954). 
16 See R. LEFLAR, supra note 12, at § 149; E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 12, at 
§ 18.17. 
17 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971). 
18 [d. 
19 378 Mass. at 540, 392 N .E.2d at 1048. 
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Massachusetts did govern with respect to plaintiff's contractual rights as a 
beneficiary.20 The Court stated, however, that the status of contract 
conflicts law in the Commonwealth needed further discussion. 21 The 
Court acknowledged that it had traditionally held that actions to enforce 
contracts were controlled by the law of the place where the contract was 
made. 22 Nevertheless, the Court noted authority recognizing that refer-
ence to the law of the place of the making or to any other one-factor test 
can produce unfair results. 23 The Court referred to Currie's "interest" 
analysis, Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws' "most significant 
relationship" test, and Leflar's "choice-influencing considerations" as 
evidence of this attitudinal change. 24 It also cited its decision in Pevoski v. 
Pevoski25 which transformed the conflicts rule for tort cases.26 The Court 
was not provided with an opportunity to select among these current 
theories, however, because of the fact pattern in the case.27 The Court 
stated: 
[N]ot only was the contract executed in Massachusetts, but the plaintiff is a 
Boston partnership, the defendant's principal place of business is in Massa-
chusetts, Steir resides in Massachusetts, and all but the early negotiations of 
settlement took place here. It is true the defendant was incorporated in 
Delaware but it has no other substantial contact with that State.28 
The vested rights lex loci contractus rule is no longer conflicts law for 
contract cases in Massachusetts despite the inopportuneness of Choate, 
Hall & Stewart for a definitive rejection of that doctrine. It is clear that the 
Supreme Judicial Court wishes to endorse the functional approach to 
contract conflicts issues already adopted by a large number of states. The 
Court will certainly take the first opportunity in an appropriate contract 
case to parallel its tort conflicts decision in Pevoski which abandoned the 
lex loci delicti rule. 29 
20 ld. 
21 ld. 
22 See Cameron v. Gonstock Acres, Inc., 370 Mass. 378, 381-82, 348 N.E.2d 791, 793 
(1976); Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878). 
23 378 Mass. at 541, 392 N.E.2d at 1048-49. 
24 ld. at 541, 392 N.E.2d at 1048-49. 
2S 371 Mass. 368,358 N .E.2d 416 (1976). The Pevoski decision is discussed in section 4 of 
this chapter. 
26 378 Mass. at 541, 392 N.E.2d at 1049. 
27 ld. 
28 Jd. 
29 There was argument that the reference in the contract to "the maximum extent 
permissible under Delaware law" meant that the parties intended Delaware law should 
govern all issues arising under the settlement agreement. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed 
with the trial judge that there was no such intention expressed in the quoted words which are 
read "most plausibly as a reference to the Delaware corporation law to fix the permissible 
extent of a corporation's indemnification of its employees." Jd. at 541-42,392 N.E.2d at 
1049. 
17
Nicholson: Chapter 7: Conflict of Laws
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1982
272 1982 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 7.7 
§ 7.7. Constructive Trust of Real Property - Law of the State with 
Dominant Contacts Controls. The movement away from vested rights 
single-test conflicts rules, so pervasive in the areas oftorts and contracts, I 
has not yet had much impact with respect to real property questions. The 
venerable law of the situs rule is still rather firmly entrenched in matters 
involving legal or beneficial interests in land. 2 It is a bit unusual when a 
court finds lex situs inappropriate to resolve a choice-of-Iaw problem in a 
real property controversy. The Appeals Court of Massachusetts used 
such an unconventional approach in the decision of Rudow v. Fogel.3 
The dispute in Rudow involved a parcel of real property located in 
Massachusetts and owned by the plaintiff's mother. 4 Before her death the 
mother conveyed the property to the defendant, her brother. 5 The trans-
fer was without consideration.6 At the time of transfer the defendant 
orally agreed that he would hold the property for the benefit of the plaintiff 
and "would turn it over to the plaintiff when [he] reached maturity."7 
When the defendant refused to transfer the real property the plaintiff, by 
his father and next friend, brought an action asserting that the defendant 
held the property in constructive trust for the plaintiff. All parties to this 
action were residents of New York.1! 
The trial judge applied Massachusetts law and ruled that there was no 
constructive trust. 9 In choosing Massachusetts law the judge followed the 
traditional conflicts rule which looks to the law of situs to determine all 
questions relating to land. lo Although he refused to decree specific per-
formance, he entered judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of the fair 
The final issue in the case was the plaintiff law partnership's standing to sue as a 
third-party beneficiary of the settlement contract. The superior court held that Massachu-
setts law prohibited the plaintiff from bringing suit. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the 
superior court's position on this question was incorrect. The settlement agreement provided 
that the defendant corporation would make payments directly to Steir's counsel, the plaintiff 
law partnership. The plaintiff, therefore, was not an "incidental beneficiary" of the contract 
but, rather, was a "creditor beneficiary" entitled to sue on the contract. ld. at 542-49, 392 
N.E.2d at 1049-53. 
§ 7.7. 1 See, e.g., Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Services, Inc., 378 Mass. 535, 392 
N.E.2d 1045 (1979); Pevoski v. Pevoski, 371 Mass. 358, 358 N.E.2d 416 (1976). See sections 
4-6 of this chapter. ' 
2 R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 165 (3d ed. 1977); w. REESE & M. ROSEN-
BERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 736-55 (7th ed. 1978). 
3 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1621, 426 N.E.2d 155. 
4 ld. at 1621, 426 N.E.2d at 156 
5 /d. at 1522, 426 N.E.2d at 156. 
6 ld. at 1622,426 N.E.2d at 157. 
7 /d. at 1622-23, 426 N.E.2d at 157. 
8 ld. at 1621-22, 426 N.E.2d at 156. 
9 /d. at 1624, 426 N.E.2d at 158. 
10/d. 
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value of the property less expenses incurred by the defendant. 11 The 
Appeals Court held that New York law applied and remanded the case to 
the superior court for a determination whether there had been a confiden-
tial relationship between the plaintiff's mother and the defendant. 12 If 
such a determination were made, a new judgment was to be entered 
ordering transfer of the property to the plaintiff. 13 
The Appeals Court recognized the difference between Massachusetts 
law and New York law as to whether the conveyance of land between 
family members imposes a constructive trust upon the transferee. 14 New 
York imposes a constructive trust in these circumstances,ls whereas Mas-
sachusetts does not. 16 In resolving this conflict of laws the trial judge, 
following the traditional lex situs rule, applied the law of Massachusetts 
since it was the locus of the land.J7 The Appeals Court refused to follow the 
lex situs doctrine in Rudow. 18 Taking its direction from recent Supreme 
Judicial Court cases which rejected one-dimensional conflicts rules,19 
the Appeals Court stated that the trial court should have considered the 
interests of both New York and Massachusetts in the transaction before 
deciding upon the appropriate law to be applied. 20 
The Appeals Court noted that Massachusetts had an important contact 
with the case because it was the situs of the land in question. 21 The 
principal interest of the situs state in real estate transactions is the protec-
tion of purchasers and other persons who depend on the record title. 22 As 
the court observed, it is more convenient for a purchaser and his title 
searchers to consult only the law of one jurisdiction.23 It was apparent, 
however, that no such persons were involved in the instant case. 24 New 
York's interest, the court continued, was in the rights and obligations of 
its domiciliaries. 25 The plaintiff, his mother, and the defendant were all 
domiciled in New York at the time the property was transferred to the 
Illd. 
12 ld. at 1622, 1631, 426 N.E.2d at 156, 161. 
13 /d. at 1631,426 N.E.2d at 161. 
14 /d. at 1623,426 N.E.2d at 157. 
15 Sinclair v. Purdy, 235 N.Y. 245, 139 N.E. 255 (1923). 
16 Meskell v. Meskell, 355 Mass. 148,243 N.E.2d 804 (1969). 
17 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1624, 426 N .E.2d at 158. 
18 /d. at 1624-27,426 N.E.2d at 158-59. 
19 See Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Services, Inc., 378 Mass. 535,392 N.E.2d 1045 
(1979); Pevoski v. Pevoski, 371 Mass. 358, 358 N.E.2d 416 (1976). See supra note I and 
accompanying text. 
20 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1627,426 N.E.2d at 159. 
21 /d. 
22 ld. 
23 /d. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 223 comment b (1971). 
24 /d. 
25 /d. at 1628, 426 N.E.2d at 160. 
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defendant in that state.26 The mother's expectation, enforceable under 
New York law, was that her brother would hold the property for her 
son.27 Since the concern at stake was not related to the situs of the land, 
but rather to regulating family obligations, the Appeals Court concluded 
that New York "has the dominant contacts and the superior claim for 
application of its law.' '28 
The lex situs citadel has been virtually impregnable in American courts 
with respect to all issues involving real property. A few, however, have 
pointed out the need to challenge the mechanical use of the situs law to 
settle all questions pertaining to land. 29 In Rudow the Appeals Court made 
a significant advance against the monolithic law of the situs rule. Land 
transactions have different issues as do tort and contract cases. The 
analysis which applies the laws of different states to various phases of a 
tort or contract pertains with equal logic to real property cases. The 
Rudow decision further emphasizes the rapidity with which Massachu-
setts is making the transition from the vested rights to the contacts 
approach in its conflicts law. 
B. THE SURVEY YEAR 
§ 7.S. Prejudgment Interest on Damages for Breach of Contract - Law of 
the State Chosen by the Parties to Govern the Contract Controls. When 
transactions cross state borders, it is not uncommon for contracting 
parties to include in the agreement which state's law will govern the rights 
and obligations of the parties under the contract. In the instance of 
litigation, whether the parties' choice of law will in fact be controlling is a 
question of state conflict oflaws doctrine. In Morris v. Watsco, Inc.,1 the 
Supreme Judicial Court clarified the Massachusetts conflict laws rule 
relating to the contracting parties' choice of law and the issue of interest 
payable as damages for breach of contract. The Court's decision com-
ports with the principles set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict 
of Laws. 
The defendant Watsco was a Florida corporation engaged in the busi-
ness of manufacturing and selling professional hair spray systems and 
products.2 The plaintiff Morris entered into a distributorship agreement 
with Watsco by which Morris became the exclusive distributor of Watsco 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 1627-28, 426 N.E.2d at 159-60. 
29 See Hancock, Conceptual Devices for Avoiding the Land Taboo in Conflict of Laws: 
The Disadvantages of Disingenuousness, 20 STAN. L. REV. I (1%7). 
§ 7.8. 1 385 Mass. 672,433 N.E.2d 886 (1982). 
2 [d. at 673, 433 N .E.2d at 887. 
20
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1982 [1982], Art. 10
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1982/iss1/10
§ 7.8 CONFLICT OF LAWS 275 
products in parts of Massachusetts. 3 The contract provided that it was to 
be construed and enforced according to the laws of Florida.4 Watsco 
subsequently terminated Morris' distributorship.s Morris brought an ac-
tion in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, 
alleging breach of contract and unfair and deceptive trade practices. 6 
Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship.7 The court entered 
judgment for the plaintiff in accordance with the jury's verdict awarding 
damages, and then added prejudgment interest calculated pursuant to 
Massachusetts law. 8 
The defendant appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit and challenged the computation of prejudgment interest in 
accordance with Massachusetts law. 9 Watsco contended that the cases 
cited as authority for the application of Massachusetts law to the interest 
question were outmoded and no longer stated the controlling law of the 
Commonwealth. 10 The court of appeals then certified the following ques-
tion of law to the Supreme Judicial Court: "Under Massachusetts law, 
what law is to be applied in determining whether, and at what rate, 
pre-judgment interest should be awarded on the recovery for an unliqui-
dated contract claim when the underlying contract provides that it is to be 
construed and enforced according to the law of a foreign jurisdiction 
(Florida law in this instance)?"11 
Because the case was before the federal court under diversity jurisdic-
tion, the Supreme Judicial Court first considered the Erie problem. Under 
the Rules of Decision Act,12 the federal diversity court must apply the 
substantive law of the state in which it sits.13 The substantive state law 
includes its conflict of laws rules. 14 The Court concluded properly that the 
federal court of appeals was correct when it recognized that the pre-
judgment interest question was to be determined by Massachusetts 







9 ld. at 673-74, 433 N .E.2d at 887-88. 
10 Id. at 674, 433 N.E.2d at 888. 
11 /d. at 672-73, 433 N.E.2d at 887. 
12 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970). 
13 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
14 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). The United States Supreme 
Court has recently reaffirmed its Klaxon ruling in Day & Zimmerman v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 
3 (1975). 
15 385 Mass. at 674, 433 N.E.2d at 888. 
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The next question addressed by the Supreme Judicial Court was 
whether Massachusetts conflicts law would recognize the right of the 
parties to select the law governing their contract. 16 The original Restate-
ment of Conflict of Laws, with its lex loci contractus rule,17 denied effect 
to a choice of law by the parties to a contract. The rationale behind this 
approach was that, because it was for the law and the courts to determine 
the validity of a contract, such power of selection would be an impermis-
sible derogation from judicial authority.18 This view is now obsolete, and 
the Restatement (Second) gives the parties to the contract the power to 
choose the governing law. 19 It is now generally recognized that the prime 
objectives of contract law are to protect the expectations of the parties 
and to make it possible for them to predict their rights and liabilities under 
the agreement.2o In multi-state transactions these objectives can best be 
attained by allowing the parties to choose the law which will govern the 
validity of the contract and the rights which it creates. Certainty and 
predictability of result are thereby most likely to be secured.21 
Massachusetts law, the Court stated, recognizes the right of the parties 
to a contract to select the governing law. 22 The Court referred to the 
choice-of-Iaw section of the Uniform Commercial Code where, in transac-
tions bearing a reasonable relation both to the Commonwealth and to 
another jurisdiction, "the parties may agree that the law either of this 
state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and 
duties. "23 The Court also cited its decision in Maxwell Shapiro Woolen 
Company v. Amerotron Corporation, 24 where it acknowledged that per-
mitting parties to stipulate the governing law added certainty to the 
agreement. 2S Clearly, the Court noted, the rule of party autonomy in 
contracts is conflicts doctrine in Massachusetts as it is in most other 
states.26 Massachusetts conflicts law, therefore, would call for the appli-
cation of Florida law to all substantive questions arising under the con-
tract in Morris. 27 
The Supreme Judicial Court then turned to the matter of the law 
governing pre-judgment interest. 28 The Court's analysis to this point 
16 [d. at 674-75, 433 N.E.2d at 888. 
17 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (1934). 
18 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment e (1971). 
19 [d. at § 187. 
20 [d. at comment e. 
21/d. 
22 385 Mass. at 674, 433 N.E.2d at 888. 
23 ld. (quoting O.L. c. 106, § 1-105(1». 
24 339 Mass. 252, 158 N.E.2d 875 (1959). 
2S [d. at 257 n.3, 158 N.E.2d at 878-79 n.3. 
26 385 Mass. at 674-75, 433 N.E.2d at 888. 
27 ld. 
28 [d. at 675, 433 N.E.2d at 888. 
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indicated that since the parties had chosen Florida to govern the contract, 
Florida law should govern the determination of pre-judgment interest 
under Massachusetts conflicts doctrine. 29 The federal district court, how-
ever, had applied Massachusetts rather than Florida law in determining 
pre-judgment interest. The Supreme Court explained that the 
confusion arose from early Massachusetts cases which treated pre-
judgment interest as payable for delay, a "procedural" question con-
trolled by the law of the forum.30 This accounted for the federal district 
court's choice of Massachusetts law, because Massachusetts was the 
forum state.3! In Morris, the Court rejected the "procedural" character-
ization of interest payments, and stated that pre-judgment interest is a 
"substantive" right flowing from the breach of contract. 32 It found that 
the only remaining justification for the use of Massachusetts law in these 
circumstances was the longevity ofthe old rule. 33 The Court concluded as 
follows: 
We have no hesitancy in concluding that the parties to the contract involved 
in this case intended that their rights should be determined by Florida law 
and that those rights include the determination of damages, including inter-
est, to be paid as a consequence of a breach of contract. . . . Their 
agreement should be given effect. 34 
The Court found that its decision in favor of Florida law was in agree-
ment with the principles of Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.35 
Under the Restatement view, "[t]he law of the state chosen by the parties 
to govern their contractual rights and duties"36 will be applied to deter-
mine the measure of recovery for breach of contract, including "whether 
plaintiff can recover interest, and, if so, the rate, upon damages awarded 
him for the period between the breach of contract and the rendition of 
judgment. "37 In answering the conflicts question certified to it by the 
federal court of appeals, the Supreme Judicial Court has again demon-
strated its reliance upon the Restatement (Second). The position of the 
Restatement (Second) that interest is part of the substantive right to 
damages for breach of contract is clearly the better rule of law. 
29 See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text. 
30 385 Mass. at 675, 433 N.E.2d at 888-89; see Ayer v. Tilden, 81 Mass. (15 Gray) 178 
(1860). 
31 385 Mass. at 675, 433 N.E.2d at 889. 
32 [d. at 675-76, 433 N.E.2d at 889. 
33 [d. at 675-76, 433 N.E.2d at 888-89. 
34 [d. at 676-77, 433 N.E.2d at 889. The Court indicated that the law of Massachusetts and 
the law of Florida might differ with respect to the rate of interest (perhaps less in Florida), 
the date from which it is determined, and the entity (jury, clerk, or judge) which makes the 
interest determination. [d. at 677 n.7, 433 N.E.2d at 890 n.7. 
35 [d. at 677, 433 N.E.2d at 889. 
36 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(1) (1971). 
37 [d. at § 207 comment e. 
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§ 7.9. Recognition of Foreign Country Custody Decree - Requirements. 
The effect to be given to the decision of a foreign court can be an 
interesting issue when the matter litigated before the foreign court is 
subsequently placed before an American court. There is some debate over 
whether principles of res judicata should apply with foreign judgments. I 
In Schiereck v. Schiereck, 2 the Appeals Court of Massachusetts enforced 
a West German divorce decree which granted custody of the parties' 
minor daughter to the husband. The court was satisfied that the law 
applied by the West German courts was reasonably similar to the law and 
practice of the Commonwealth in child custody cases.3 
The parties were married in West Germany.4 The husband was a West 
German citizen and the wife was a citizen of the United States.s Shortly 
after the birth of their daughter the couple separated and divorce and 
custody proceedings were commenced in a West German court. 6 After a 
full hearing with counsel on both sides, the West German court issued a 
judgment dissolving the marriage and awarding custody of the child to the 
husband. 7 The court, after a careful evaluation of the evidence as to the 
family situation, concluded that living with the father would serve the best 
interests of the child. 8 The wife appealed from the judgment and, while 
her appeal was pending, removed the child from West Germany to 
Massachusetts. 9 Subsequently, the Supreme Judicial Court of Bavaria 
affirmed the judgment of the lower court. IO 
After the husband located his missing daughter in Massachusetts, he 
brought an action in a Massachusetts probate court seeking enforcement 
of the West German judgment. 11 The probate judge ordered enforcement 
but modified the West German decree to allow visitation rights to the 
wife. 12 Both parties appealed. 13 The wife contended that the judge should 
have held an evidentiary hearing to determine if the custody award was in 
the best interests of the child. 14 The husband argued that the judge abused 
his discretion by granting periodic visitation rights to the wife and requir-
§ 7.9. 1 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). 
2 14 Mass. App. Ct. 378, 439 N.E.2d 859 (1982). 
3 ld. at 381-82, 439 N.E.2d at 862. 
4 ld. at 379, 439 N.E.2d at 860. 
sId. 
6 ld. 
7 ld. at 379, 439 N.E.2d at 861. 
8 ld. at 379-80, 439 N.E.2d at 861. 
9 ld. at 380, 439 N.E.2d at 861. 
10ld. 
11 ld. 
12 ld. at 378, 439 N.E.2d at 860. 
131d. 
14 ld. at 378-79, 439 N.E.2d at 860. 
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ing him to pay the daughter's transportation costs to and from the wife's 
homeY The Appeals Court affirmed. 16 
Judgments rendered in a foreign country are not entitled to the protec-
tion of the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution. 17 In 
many states, however, the doctrine of comity is invoked whereby foreign 
country judgments, provided they comply with due process requirements, 
will be accorded the same degree of recognition to which sister state 
jUdgments are entitled. IS The Appeals Court stated that Massachusetts, 
by comity, generally will recognize the judgment of a foreign country 
court. 19 The court then listed the conditions for recognizing a foreign 
court child custody order: (1) the foreign court had jurisdiction over the 
persons whose rights were to be determined and the subject matter; (2) 
the foreign court applied procedural and substantive law comparable to 
that of Massachusetts, and; (3) the custody decree promoted the best 
interests of the chiId. 20 
The Appeals Court found that all three conditions were satisfied in the 
Schiereck case.21 The wife conceded that the West German courts had 
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter.22 An examination of 
the documentary record of the proceedings in the West German courts 
established that the wife received a full and fair hearing.23 With respect to 
custody the apposite West German law required the court to reach "a 
decision which most closely corresponds to the well-being of the child."24 
In response to that statutory command the West German judge spe-
cifically stated that "[t]he court, therefore, had to reach a decision which 
was in the best interest of the child. "25 To make that determination the 
West German court reviewed welfare agency reports and psychological 
data from interviews with the parents. 26 The Massachusetts Appeals 
Court concluded that the law applied by the West German courts was 
similar to Massachusetts law and that the West German custody decree 
followed the best interests of the child. The probate judge, therefore, in 
the absence of any allegation of changed circumstances, acted correctly in 
15 Id. at 379, 439 N.E.2d at 860. 
16/d. 
17 U.S. CONST., art. IV, § I. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). 
18 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 (1971). 
19 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 380, 439 N.E.2d at 861 (citing Kapigian v. Minassian, 212 Mass. 
412,99 N .E.2d 264 (1912) (recognizing dissolution of Turkish marriage under Turkish law». 
20/d. 
21 /d. at 380-82, 439 N.E.2d at 861-62. 
22 Id. at 380, 439 N .E.2d at 861. 
23 Id. at 381, 439 N.E.2d at 861. 
24 /d. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 381, 439 N.E.2d at 862. 
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not holding a hearing.27 The Appeals Court held, finally, that the probate 
judge had acted properly in modifying the West German decree with 
respect to the wife's visitation rights. 28 She was financially unable to 
travel to Germany to visit her daughter. 29 
The Appeal Court's recognition and enforcement of the decree of the 
West German court in Schiereck follows the usual practice in American 
courts with respect to foreign country divorce and custody decrees. As 
the Supreme Judicial Court has stated: "The principle of international law 
being that the law of the country of domicile of the spouses affords the 
guide for deciding upon the commencement, continuance and ending of 
marriage, in reason it must govern divorce as well as every other incident 
of matrimony." 30 The Appeals Court did not discuss the question of 
domicile in Sc'hiereck, but it must have assumed that the husband and wife 
were domiciled in West Germany at the time of the divorce proceedings. 
It should be noted, however, that the comity doctrine does not require a 
Massachusetts court to enforce the judgment of a foreign country court in 
areas outside family law. In Hilton v. Guyot 31 the United States Supreme 
Court held that ajudgment of a court of a foreign country would be given 
conclusive effect only if the courts of that nation would give similar effect 
to judgments rendered in the United States.32 Where such reciprocity 
does not exist, the foreign judgment is only prima facie evidence of the 
correctness of the underlying claim.33 Early Massachusetts decisions had 
anticipated the prima facie evidence rule of Hilton. 34 
The reciprocity doctrine of the Hilton case has not received much 
approbation from the commentators3S and has been rejected by many 
state courtS.36 It is submitted that the rule which applies the principles of 
res judicata to judgments rendered in foreign countries is more in accord 
with the public interest in seeing a timely end to litigation. It seems likely 
that Massachusetts courts in the future will disregard the venerable prima 
27 [d. at 381-82, 439 N.E.2d at 862. In deciding custody cases Massachusetts courts, and 
American courts generally, will give primary consideration to protecting the best interests of 
the child. See Rolde v. Rolde, 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1567,425 N.E.2d 388. 
28 Id. at 382, 439 N.E.2d at 862. 
29 [d. 
30 Kapigian v. Minassian, 212 Mass. 412, 415, 99 N.E.2d 264, 265 (1912). 
31 159 U.S. 113 (1895). 
32 Id. at 210. 
33 [d. at 228. 
34 See, e.g., Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462 (1813); Buttrick v. Allen, 8 Mass. 273 (1811). 
3S See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 84 (3d ed. 1977); E. SCOLES & P. HAY, 
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 24.33-24.37 (1982). 
36 See e.g., Feuchter v. Bazurto, 22 Ariz. App. 178,528 P.2d 178 (1974); Coburn v. 
Joseph, 195 Ga. 723, 25 S.E.2d 576 (1943); Johnson v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 
242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121 (1926). 
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facie evidence doctrine when considering the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign country in personam judgments. 
§ 7.10. Diversity Jurisdiction - Tort Conflicts Rule - Charitable Immu-
nity. In Mason v. Southern New England Conference Association of 
Seventh-Day Adventists, I the plaintiff sought damages in federal court 
for injuries she received on the defendant's negligently maintained prem-
ises. 2 Jurisdiction was based upon diversity of citizenship.3 The United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was faced with two issues on 
appeal. The first was a conflict of laws question, and the second pertained 
to the scope of the Massachusetts charitable immunity statute. 4 
The defendant Association was a charitable, non-profit organization 
incorporated under the laws of Massachusetts.s It operated a private 
religious school in Massachusetts. 6 In the school building was a multipur-
pose room containing a motion picture screen used to show educational 
films.7 The plaintiff Mason, a resident of Maine, attended a family 
Christmas party at the school. 8 The plaintiff and other family members 
were Seventh-Day Adventists and had been students at the schooP 
Because of this relationship the school had made the building available to 
the family free of charge. 10 During the party the motion picture screen fell 
and injured the plaintiff. I I 
Mason and her husband brought suit against the Association in the 
United States District Court for the District of Maine. 12 Judgment was 
entered on jury verdicts awarding $149,881.80 to the plaintiff for her 
injuries and $6,000 to her husband for loss of consortium. \3 The Associa-
tion moved to amend the judgment on the strength of the Massachusetts 
limited charitable immunity statute. 14 The district court reduced the 
§ 7.10. 1 696 F.2d 135 (1st CiT. 1982). 
2 ld. at 135-36. 
3 /d. at 135. 
4 Id. 
S /d. at 135-36. 








14 /d. See G.L. c. 231, § 85K. Section 85K abrogated the tort immunity granted charitable 
institutions by the common law. It goes on to provide "that if the tort was committed in the 
course of any activity carried on to accomplish directly the charitable purposes of such 
corporation, trust, or association, liability in any such cause of action shall not exceed the 
sum of twenty thousand dollars exclusive of interest and costs." 
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amount of the personal injury damages to $20,000 plus interest and costs, 
the parties having settled the husband's loss of consortium claim.ls The 
plaintiff Mason appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit. 16 She contended first that the district court should have 
applied Maine law whereby she might have recovered full damages, 17 and 
second that Massachusetts law, if applicable, did not limit recovery be-
cause the Association's activities in question were not "directly charita-
ble. "18 The federal court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the district 
court. 19 
Because it was a diversity jurisdiction case the appeals court initially 
addressed the Erie/Klaxon doctrine2o and its requirements. 21 Under this 
doctrine federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply the 
substantive law of the state in which it sits22 including that state's conflict 
of laws rules. 23 The court of appeals therefore concluded correctly that 
the federal district court was bound to apply Maine conflicts law. 24 
The court of appeals then turned to an analysis of the current Maine 
conflicts doctrine in the tort area.2S The Mason court first considered 
Beaulieu v. Beaulieu, 26 a case where the Maine Supreme Court held that 
Maine law, not that of Massachusetts, governed in a suit arising out of an 
automobile accident in Massachusetts. 27 The Mason court recognized 
that the Beaulieu decision definitively rejected the vested rights lex loci 
delicti rule which had formerly been the established tort conflicts rule in 
Maine. 28 According to the court in Mason, the Beaulieu court refused 
to apply the Massachusetts' guest statute because Maine contacts29 were 
clearly superior to those of Massachusetts.3o The court of appeals also 
looked at Adams v. Buffalo Forge Company,31 a case where the Maine 
IS 696 F.2d at 136. 
16 Jd. 
17 Jd. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 158. The Maine statute abolished the common 
law tort immunity defense for charitable organizations, but it limits the tort liability of the 
charitable institution to the coverage specified in the insurance policy. 
18 696 F.2d at 136. 
19 Jd. at 140. 
20 Jd. at 136. 
21 "In diversity cases a federal court must apply the choice of law rules of the state in 
which it sits." Jd. (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487,496 (1941». 
22 See Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
23 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
24 696 F.2d at 136. 
2S Jd. 
26 265 A.2d 610 (Me. 1970). 
27 Jd. at 615. 
28 696 F.2d at 136. 
29 Jd. at 137. 
30 Jd. 
31 443 A.2d 932 (Me. 1982). 
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Supreme Judicial Court further clarified its new conflicts law by expressly 
adopting the "most significant relationship" test of the Restatement (Sec-
ond).32 After reviewing these Maine cases, the federal court of appeals 
concluded that it had to consider the Restatement (Second) to determine 
what law a Maine court would apply. 33 
In accordance with its evaluation of Maine conflicts doctrine, the court 
of appeals next examined the approach of the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflicts.34 In tort cases, the court noted, the Restatement (Second) 
recommends the application of the law of the state with the most sig-
nificant relationship to the parties and the event, enumerating various 
contacts35 to be considered in determining the law.36 The Restatement 
further specifies, observed the court, that in personal injury cases the law 
of the state of the injury generally governs the rights and liabilities of the 
parties unless another state has a more significant relationship to the 
injury.37 Therefore, the court of appeals determined, the Restatement, 
and presumably a Maine court, would favor the law of Massachusetts, the 
state of the injury, in the case at hand unless Maine somehow had superior 
contacts.38 The only contact with Maine was the residence of the plaintiff 
Mason. Massachusetts was the place of injury, the place where the 
injury-causing conduct occurred, and the place of the defendant's incor-
poration.39 Clearly, the court of appeals concluded, the contacts pointed 
toward Massachusetts. 40 
Nor did policy considerations, which the Restatement (Second) makes 
relevant to all conflicts cases,41 swing the balance away from Massachu-
setts law, according to the court of appeals. 42 The court found that the 
policy in favor of upholding the expectations of the parties, of particular 
importance in contractual relationships, has no applicability in tort 
cases.43 Persons usually do not plan personal injury situations. Further-
more, the policies expressed in the Maine and Massachusetts charitable 
immunity statutes did not provide the court of appeals with a rule of 
32 Id. at 934 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145-46 (1971). 
33 696 F.2d at 137. 
34 /d. 
35 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971). The Restatement 
(Second) lists the place of injury, the place where the injury-causing conduct occurred, and 
the domicile and place of incorporation of the parties as relevent contacts. /d. 
36 /d. 
37 Jd. at § 146. 
38 696 F.2d at 137. 
39 /d. 
40 /d. 
41 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971). 
42 696 F.2d at 137. 
43 Jd. 
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decision. 44 It was not possible, the court noted, to judge that the inherent 
merits of one statute were better than the other.45 The court found no 
cogent reason to subordinate the law of Massachusetts to that of Maine.46 
The federal court of appeals therefore upheld the district court's choice of 
Massachusetts law.47 
The decision of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Mason 
shows an admirable understanding and use of the "most significant rela-
tionship" test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. It there-
fore is a decision worth noting because the Massachusetts courts have 
demonstrated a predilection for the Restatement (Second) in conflicts 
cases. As the Mason court explains in its opinion, the determination of the 
state of "most significant relationship" is not merely a mechanical task of 
adding up contacts.48 A court must also examine relevant policy consid-
erations along with the connecting factors.49 This makes the con-
tact-weighing process a qualitative analysis, and leads to a more rational 
result than the lex loci delicti approach.50 The result reached by the 
federal court of appeals was indeed the correct one. A balancing of 
contacts and policy criteria clearly pointed to Massachusetts and its law. 
§ 7.11. Diversity Jurisdiction - Wrongful Death Actions - Conflicts 
Rules Regarding Tort Liability, Damages, and Breach of Contract of Car-
riage. During the Survey year, Judge Garrity ofthe United States District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts issued a memorandum opinion in 
44 ld. at 138. 
45 ld. 
46 ld. 
47 Id. The court of appeals then turned to the question of the interpretation of the 
Massachuset\s charitable immunity statute. The statute distinguished between the "directly 
charitable" and "primarly commercial" activities of an institution. G.L. c. 231, § 85K. In 
the former case the $20,000 limitation was applicable; in the latter, it was not. ld. The 
plaintiff Mason conceded that the defendant Association's activity was not commercial but 
she argued that its action involved in the cases was not "directly charitable," and therefore 
was not protected by the charitable immunity statute. 696 F .2d at 138. The court of appeals 
rejected the plaintiff's argument. The court examined the cases explaining the old Massa-
chusetts common law immunity doctrine and the legislative history of the charitable immu-
nity statute. This inquiry made it clear that the statute's "directly charitable" and "primarily 
commercial" categories were exclusive. The court then addressed the determinative ques-
tion: was the Association's loan of its facility to some of its members within its corporate 
powers and was it "directly charitable?" The court of appeals answered in the affirmative to 
both parts of the question, given the wide scope of the Association's charter and its broad 
interest in its membership. Therefore, the court of appeals concluded, the district court had 
correctly determined that the statutory $20,000 limitation of liability applied. 696 F.2d at 
138-41. 
48 ld. at 137. 
49 Id. 
so See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971). 
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Schulhofv. Northeast Cellulose, Inc. 1 which considered several conflict 
of laws issues. Since it was a diversity case, the court was required to 
apply the conflicts law of Massachusetts. 2 In particular the court exam-
ined and adopted the approach taken by the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts in Pevoski v. Pevoski,3 Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA 
Services, Inc.,4 and Morris v. Watsco, Inc. s As a result, the Schulhof 
decision has further clarified Massachusetts conflicts law. 
Schulhof involved consolidated wrongful death actions arising out of a 
midair collision of two aircraft over Massachusetts which resulted in the 
deaths of all five persons aboard the planes. 6 The collision occurred over 
Gardner, Massachusetts, between a Piper Aerostar and a Piper Navajo.7 
The Aerostar was owned by the defendant Northeast Cellulose, a Massa-
chusetts corporation, and carried the decedent Slivers as its passenger. 8 
Slivers, a New York domiciliary, had been in Massachusetts on busi-
ness. 9 The Aerostar was flying him from Boston to Syracuse, New 
York.lO His personal representative, the plaintiff Slivers, was also a 
domiciliary of New York. ll 
The Navajo was owned by the defendant Nash-Tamposi Flight Opera-
tion, a New Hampshire partnership, and carried the decedent Schulhof as 
its passenger. 12 Schulhof, a domiciliary of New York, had contracted with 
the defendant Whitcomb Construction Co., a New Hampshire corpora-
tion, for a round trip passage from White Plains, New York to Concord, 
New Hampshire. 13 Whitcomb transported Schulhof to New Hampshire 
but then subcontracted with N ash-Tamposi to bring Schulhof back to 
White Plains. 14 It was not clear whether the Navajo was operated by an 
employee of N ash-Tamposi or by an employee of Whitcomb on the return 
trip to White Plains. IS The plaintiff Schulhof, the personal representative 
§ 7.11. 1 545 F. Supp. 1200 (1982). 
2 Id. at 1202. 
3 371 Mass. 358, 358 N.E.2d 416 (1976). The Pevoski decision is discussed in section 4 of 
this chapter. 
4 378 Mass. 535, 392 N.E.2d 1045 (1979). The Choate, Hall & Stewart decision is 
discussed in section 6 of this chapter. 
5 385 Mass. 672,433 N .E.2d 886 (1982). The Morris decision is discussed in section 8 of 
this chapter. 
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of the decedent Schulhof, was domiciled in New York. 16 
The plaintiffs brought wrongful death actions against the defendants. 17 
In addition, the plaintiff Schulhof brought a suit for breach of a contract of 
carriage against the defendants N ash-Tamposi and Whitcomb. 18 N ash-
Tamposi and Whitcomb filed cross claims against each other for in-
demnity or contribution. 19 Because the case involved the interests of 
Massachusetts, New Hamphire, and New York, the district court decided 
to consider the choice-of-Iaw issues before the trial. 20 Judge Garrity 
identified the following issues for resolution by the law apposite under 
conflicts principles: tort liability, compensatory damages, punitive dam-
ages, contract liability, contribution between tortfeasors, and pre-
judgment interest,21 In his memorandum opinion Judge Garrity stated 
tentatively that Massachusetts law governed most of the issues he had 
enumerated.22 The judge indicated that New Hampshire law controlled 
the rest of the questions. 23 
Jurisdiction in these cases before the federal district court was based 
upon diversity of citizenship. 24 The court was therefore required to follow 
the substantive law a Massachusetts state court would apply, 25 including 
the conflict of laws rules of Massachusetts. 26 The first task for the court 
was to ascertain the Massachusetts conflicts law. 27 
The federal district court began by addressing the issue of tort liabil-
ity.28 The court turned to Pevoski v. Pevoski, 29 a case where the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts abandoned the use ofthe vested rights lex 
loci delicti rule in tort conflicts cases.30 The Pevoski court held that Massa-
chusetts law, not that of New York, governed the issue of interspousal 
immunity between spouses domiciled in Massachusetts, even though the 
suit for damages arose out of an automobile accident in New York.3\ The 
Supreme Judicial Court stated that the disposition of issues "must tum ... 
16 [d. 
17 /d. at 1200. 
18 [d. 
19 [d. 





25 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 V.S. 65 (1938). 
26 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 V.S. 487 (1941). 
27 545 F. Supp. at 1202. 
28 [d. 
29 371 Mass. 358, 358 N .E.2d 416 (1976). 
30 /d. at 360, 358 N.E.2d at 417. 
3! [d. 
32
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1982 [1982], Art. 10
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1982/iss1/10
§ 7.11 CONFLICT OF LAWS 287 
on the law of the jurisdiction which has the strongest interest in the 
resolution of the particular issue presented. "32 Judge Garrity noted that 
the Supreme Judicial Court did not explicitly adopt the "most significant 
relationship" standard of Restatement (Second)33 in Pevoski. 34 He ruled, 
however, that the Pevoski test was substantially the same as the Restate-
ment (Second) standard, and he construed this choice-of-Iaw language in 
Pevoski as an endorsement by the Supreme Judicial Court of the tort 
approach of Restatement (Second).35 Judge Garrity's conclusion that the 
significant contacts approach in Pevoski was tantamount to the adoption 
of the "most significant relationship" criterion of Restatement (Second) 
seems correct. Both approaches reject the automatic use of the lex loci 
delicti rule in favor of a more flexible rule, which prefers the law of the 
jurisdiction which has the strongest interest in a particular issue. 
Turning to the interests of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New 
York in the issue of tort liability, the district court held that Massachu-
setts law applied to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties.36 The 
collision between the two aircraft occurred in the air above Massachu-
setts.37 Massachusetts clearly had a strong interest in deterring tortious 
conduct in its airspace as it did in preventing negligence on its highways.38 
Tortious behavior in the air above Massachusetts was likely to injure 
persons and property in the Commonwealth.39 According to the court, 
neither New Hampshire nor New York had a more significant relationship 
to this rules of the road question to justify applying its law to the issue of 
liability.40 Therefore the court held that Massachusetts tort law would be 
used to judge the conduct of the parties. 41 
It is worth noting that the "most significant relationship" test of Re-
statement (Second) does not reject the lex loci delicti principle in all 
cases. It takes the position that in personal injury actions "the local law of 
the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of 
the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state 
has a more significant relationship .... "42 The Restatement (Second) 
32 /d. 
33 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145-146 (1971). 
34 545 F. Supp. at 1203. 
35 /d. 
36 ld. at 1204. 
37 /d. 
38 /d. 
39 /d. at 1205. 
40 /d. 
41 /d. at 1204-05. 
42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFlICT OF LAWS § 146 (1971). The court relied on 
§ 146 in Schulhof. It also cited § 175 which specifically pertains to wrongful death actions and 
applies the same test as § 146. 545 F. Supp. at 1204 & n.3. 
33
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recognizes that in many personal injury cases the injury factor will be the 
most important in determining liability.43 When conduct and injury occur 
in the same state, as USQally happens, the choice of the law of that state 
furthers the values of certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result. 44 It 
is generally the policy of Restatement (Second) to identify the connecting 
factor which presumptively has the "most significant relationship." In 
this way it attempts to strike a proper balance between the outmoded 
a priori vested rights approach and a totally subjective analysis of contacts. 
The federal district court turned next to the issue of damages.45 The 
Restatement (Second) provides that the question of damages in wrongful 
death actions should be governed by the law of the state of the injury 
unless aoother state has a more significant relationship to the transaction 
and th~ parties.46 After identifying the contacts of the three states with the 
occurrence, the court decided to apply the Massachusetts wrongful death 
statute to compensatory as well as punitive damages.47 With respect to 
both kinds of damages the court emphasized the deterrent purpose.48 
Massachusetts, as the place of the wrong, the court reasoned, had the 
greatest interest in deterring behavior which causes injury and death 
within its borders.49 
The district court acknowledged that the matter of compensatory dam-
ages raised a difficult question as to the governing law. 50 The purpose of 
compensatory damages is to reimburse plaintiffs for their financialloss.H 
Since the plaintiffs were domiciliaries of New York, the court noted, New 
York arguably had a greater interest in the damages issue than Massachu-
setts.52 The court examined the New York and Massachusetts wrongful 
death statutes and found no difference between them.53 Like the New 
York statute, the Massachusetts act awards "the fair monetary value of 
the decedent to the persons entitled to receive the damages recovered" 
and identifies certain types of damages. 54 The deterrent effect of the 
Massachusetts statute called for the application of its law with respect to 
accidents in Massachusetts.55 The choice of Massachusetts law by the 
43 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 146 (1971). 
44 Id. at comments c and d. 
4S 545 F. Supp. at 1205. 
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 178 (1971). 
47 545 F. Supp. at 1206. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 1205-08. 
so Id. at 1207. 
SI See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 126 (3d ed. 1977). 
S2 545 F. Supp. at 1207. 
S3 Id. 
S4 G.L. c. 229, § 2. 
ss 545 F. Supp. at 1207-08. The federal district court also ruled that pre-judgment interest 
for the tort claims was a substantive matter to be determined by state law. Id. (citing 
34
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1982 [1982], Art. 10
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1982/iss1/10
§ 7.11 CONFLICT OF LAWS 289 
court follows usual practice in this kind of situation. Since there was no 
difference between the New York and Massachusetts statutes, there was 
no conflict of laws problem regarding compensatory damages. Therefore 
the federal district court, sitting as a Massachusetts state court in this 
diversity action, applied the law of the forum. 
The plaintiff Schulhof brought additional causes of action against the 
defefldants Nash-Tamposi and Whitcomb for breach of a contract of 
carriage.56 The plaintiff's position was that the decedent Schulhof con-
tracted with the defendants to transport him safely from New Hampshire 
to New York, that the defendants breached their contractual duties as a 
common carrier, and that this breach was the proximate cause of 
Schulhof's death.57 The defendants argued that New Hampshire law 
should control the contract issue, contending that a Massachusetts court 
would apply New Hampshire law under the "most significant relation-
ship" test of the Restatement (Second).s8 The plaintiff maintained that the 
breach of contract claim essentially sounded in tort and should be gov-
erned by Massachusetts law which applied to the tort issues.59 
The district court turned to Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Services, 
Inc. 60 for guidance in this contract conflicts question.61 In that decision 
the Supreme Judicial Court rejected the traditional lex loci contractus 
principle as well as any other one-factor test in favor of a contacts 
approach.62 It chose not to articulate its new rule with further spec-
ificity.63 Judge Garrity concluded, however, that the Choate, Hall & 
Stewart opinion indicated that the Supreme Judicial Court would adopt 
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.64 
The district court found that sections 188 and 197 of the Restatement 
(Second) were relevant to the contract issue in Schulhof. 6s The two 
defendants were New Hampshire entities, and the contract was made and 
primarily performed in New Hampshire.66 In the absence of a choice of 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 171, comment c (1971); Morris v. 
Watsco, Inc., 385 Mass. 672, 433 N.E.2d 886 (1982». The court held that because Massa-
chusetts law governs tort damage issues, Massachusetts law would also govern the awarding 
of pre-judgment interest for the tort claims. 545 F. Supp. at 1211. 
S6 545 F. Supp. at 1208-09. 
S7 ld. at 1208. 
S8 ld. 
S9 ld. 
60 378 Mass. 535, 392 N .E.2d 1045 (1979). 
61 545 F. Supp. at 1209. 
62 378 Mass. at 540-41, 392 N.E.2d at 1048-49. 
63 ld. 
64 545 F. Supp. at 1209. 
6S ld. at 1209-10. 
661d. 
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law by the parties to the contract these contacts established that New 
Hampshire was the state with the greatest interest in the parties' contrac-
tual rights and duties. 67 Moreover, the court stated, the rights created by a 
contract for the transportation of passengers, absent a stipulated choice of 
law by the parties, are determined by the law of the state of departure. 68 
The court found that New Hampshire was the place of departure. 69 The 
court concluded, therefore, that New Hampshire governed the contract 
causes of action. 70 The choice of New Hampshire law contributed to the 
certainty and predictability so important in contract cases. 71 
The final conflicts question in Schulhof concerned the cross claims 
between Nash-Tamposi and Whitcomb for indemnity or contribution. 72 
The district court could not find any Massachusetts case dealing with this 
conflicts issue. 73 It looked to the apposite section of Restatement (Sec-
ond) which designates the domiciliary state of the tortfeasors as the 
jurisdiction with the greatest interest in the issues of contribution and 
indemnity.74 Accordingly, the court concluded that New Hampshire law 
governed since the two interested parties were domiciled there. 75 
The opinion of the federal district court in Schulhof does not have the 
same authority as an opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts. The latter tribunal is the ultimate arbiter of conflict of law rules in 
Massachusetts, subject, of course, to the limitations of the federal con-
stitution. The district court, however, was acting in this instance as a 
surrogate for the Supreme Judicial Court since Schulhof was a diversity 
case. It cited, analyzed, and applied the relevant decisions ofthe Supreme 
Judicial Court to the conflicts issues before it. Judge Garrity's opinion 
therefore represents important evidence of the conflicts law of Massachu-
setts. Without question, Massachusetts courts are committed to a con-
tacts approach to conflicts problems, more specifically, to the "most 
significant relationship" test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
Laws. 
67 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971). 
68 Id. at § 197. 
69 545 F. Supp. at 1209-10. 
70 /d. 
71 Id. The federal district court did not accept the plaintiff Schulhof's argument that her 
contract claim was essentially a tort claim and should, therefore, be governed by Massachu-
setts law. Id. at 1210. Contract and tort claims have different purposes. A breach of contract 
action is designed to place the wronged party in status quo ante. Damages in a tort claim 
have a much stronger deterrent aim. Consequently, these differences justify applying the law 
of different states to contract and tort actions. Massachusetts had the greater interest in the 
tortious conduct within its borders. It had no comparable interest in the New Hampshire 
contract in Schulhof /d. 
72 /d. at 1208. 
73 Id. 
74 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 173, comments a and b (1971). 
7S 545 F. Supp. at 1208. 
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